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This paper argues that a two-tier system has evolved dividing intra-UK/EU marriages from extra-UK/EU 
marriages. For the former, marriage is a contract between two individuals overseen by a facilitating 
state. For the latter, marriage has become more of a legal status defined and controlled by an intrusive 
and obstructive state. I argue that this divergence in legislating regulation is steeped in an ethnicized 
imagining of 'Britishness' whereby the more noticeably 'other' migrants (by skin colour or religion) are 
perceived as a threat to the national character. The conceptualisation of women as legally "disabled" 
citizens (1870 Naturalisation Act) for whom a state must act as responsible patriarch, is a fundamental 
part of this imagining of the nation. The paper therefore examines the social (gendered and 
ethnicized) assumptions and political aims embedded within the legislation. 
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These are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; upon which we may observe, 
that even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the most part intended for her 
protection and benefit. So great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England. 
William Blackstone (1769) 
In his 2013 book Exodus, government advisor Paul Collier CBE contends that family migration is 
the only category of immigration regulation that is of any significance to the regulating state. Collier 
argues that if all citizens regardless of ethnic heritage have the same rights to bring in a foreign spouse, 
then ͚diaspora relatives will just crowd out everyone else͛ (BBC 2013b). He claims that his argument 
is about ͚nation͛ not ͚race͛, about the loss of trust and social capital that comes with the presence of 
͚diasporas͛, a term ǁhiĐh he defiŶes as ͚the aĐĐuŵulated stoĐk of unabsorbed migrants͛ (2013:258 
emphasis in original). For Collier, the threat to the nation-state is not economic but social. Collieƌ͛s 




position is hardly new, echoing Margaret Thatcher in 1978i, Enoch Powell in 1968ii, and harking right 
ďaĐk to the ϭϳϬϴ ͚AĐt foƌ ŶatuƌaliziŶg FoƌeigŶ PƌotestaŶts͛ ǁhiĐh ǁas ƌepealed afteƌ thƌee Ǉeaƌs 
because ͚national identity was felt to be under attack͛ (Fransman 1998:159).iii What marks Collier, 
Thatcher and Powell out from other policy-makers of the last fifty years, is their explicit 
acknowledgement of a usually unspoken objective of immigration regulation: the preservation and 
definition of a national culture. What they in turn fail to recognise is the extent to which policy-makers 
do harness the law in order to preserve and define their ͚imagined community͛ (Anderson 1991) 
through the exclusion of uŶdesiƌaďle otheƌs. Despite Collieƌ͛s Đlaiŵs, aŶd although fƌeƋueŶtlǇ Đloaked 
in a discourse of protection and benefit (both of individual female citizens and of a feminized welfare 
state), rules relating to family migration and, in particular, marriage migration, have always involved 
attempts to limit entry of particular ͚diaspora relatives͛ ;BBC 2013b) whose customs and norms are 
perceived to threaten the cultural identity of Britain. 
Scholars have examined the inherent tension within liberal democracies surrounding notions of 
universal citizenship for a limited citizenry (Anderson 2013; Bosniak 2006; Cohen 2009). Analysis of 
marriage within the framework of this tension has shown an underlying reliance on a binary of active-
dependent citizen (Fineman 2004) as well as opposing political viewpoints over what is seen as 
protection or empowerment (Dustin and Phillips 2008; Macey 2008). Within this overarching 
fƌaŵeǁoƌk, the ƌegulatioŶ of ͚ŵaƌƌiage-ƌelated ŵigƌatioŶ͛ to the UK has ďeeŶ ĐƌitiĐallǇ appƌeheŶded 
at particular junctures (Charsley et al 2012), from particular (socio-legal) disciplinary viewpoints (Wray 
2011) or considered particular rules (e.g. Wray et al 2015; Pannick et al 1993). Building on this work, I 
argue that a two-tier system has evolved dividing intra-UK/EU marriages from extra-UK/EU marriages. 
For the former, marriage is a contract between two individuals overseen by a facilitating state, a 
notion explored briefly in the first section. For the latter, marriage has become more of a legal status 
defined and controlled by an intrusive and obstructive state, a contention examined in detail in the 
central analysis of the paper. Viewing the current juncture on marriage migration to the UK through a 
historical lens, I argue that policy-makers continue to use legal measures to limit spousal entry of 
particular ethnic groups, and to select for entry couples whose marriage conforms to an ideal-type of 
marriage, one that is no longer demanded of intra-UK/EU unions. To that end, with an intersectional 
approach, I examine the laws, policies and regulations that have made up the immigration legislation 
as well as the political discourse of protection that accompanied their enactments. From a legislative 
and working-practice perspective, change has been the one constant of the statute board with twenty-
one acts relating to immigration since 1962, and seven in the last ten years alone. Despite this flurry 
of legislative activity and despite the shifts in power between Conservative and Labour governments, 




historical analysis of the regulation of marriage-related migration to the UK shows more ideological 
continuity than change. 
Intra-UK/EU Marriages – Marriage as a Contract 
The 1753 Marriage Act saw the first intrusion by the State as a third party into what had 
previously been a bilateral contract between two parties (Stone 1977). The Act set a minimum age, 
decreed who could marry whom (consanguinity), and provided for legal recognition of only those 
marriages conducted by the Church and state licence system.iv It did not, however, dictate the purpose 
of marriage, something which remains unchanged today. British citizens can marry each other fully 
intending never to live with one another or to consummate the marriage. They can marry for tax 
purposes, for inheritance, to provide care, or with the intention of compromising evidence in a murder 
trial. v  Marriage, says Lord Millet, ͚need not be loving, sexual, stable, faithful, long-lasting, or 
contented͛ (quoted in Herring 2011:43). From this list, the only direct legal change since 1753 has 
been to the requirement that marriage be ͚long-lasting͛: the 1969 Divorce Reform Act (which came 
into effect in 1971) allowing divorce on the grounds of adultery, behaviour with which it would be 
unreasonable to live with, desertion and mutual consent after two years, or five years if without the 
consent of both parties. Whether current developments which challenge marriage as the fundamental 
embodiment of heterosexuality induce change to marriage as an ideology remains to be seen: 
legislation allowing same-sex marriage in the UK came into force in March 2014. Immigration law has 
kept pace with modifications in law in relation to same-sex partnership. 
There have been major transformations in UK marital practice over the last sixty years, and 
ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶglǇ, ŵajoƌ ĐhaŶges iŶ the ŵajoƌitǇ͛s attitudes to the institution of marriage (Chamber 
2012). People who do marry are marrying later in life than previously and the rate of divorce has 
increased dramatically (Barlow et al 2005). UK marriages are at their lowest rate since 1917 and many 
are choosing to spurn the institution of marriage completely (Barlow et al 2005). Noting such changes, 
social commentators such as Giddens (1992) and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) have celebrated these 
developments as a product of a reflexive and efficacious individualism which they see as breaking the 
shackles of the male-breadwinner/female-homemaker family model, which tied sexuality to 
reproduction and reproduction to the institution of marriage. Others have noted, however, that 
despite outward changes in practice, the institution of marriage as a life-long, state-sanctioned 
commitment based on unequal and gendered divisions continues to act as ͚hegemonic ideal͛ (Gross 
2005:288; Barlow et al 2005, Chambers 2012). All have noted the relatively recent phenomenon of 
romantic love as the defining pillar of cohabiting and marital partnerships. 




Whilst there was little legal change to the notion of marriage as contract, the UK State spent 
considerable energy in the twentieth century regulating marital status to prescribe a gendered ideal-
type of marriage comprised of aŶ ͚ aĐtiǀe ĐitizeŶ͛ aŶd his depeŶdeŶt ;JaŵiesoŶ aŶd CuŶŶiŶghaŵ-Burley 
2003). Feminists have long-since examined – and campaigned to dismantle – such provisions which 
upheld the institution of marriage as the sine qua non of gender inequality. The legal regulation of 
ƌepƌoduĐtioŶ iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ sought to liŵit ŶotioŶs of ͞faŵilǇ͟ to the heteƌoseǆual ŶuĐleaƌ ŵodel 
(Chambers 2012). Since the late 1980s, however, whether due to successful campaigning, or reflective 
of wider societal change, governments have focused their regulating energy on biological ties as the 
purveyors of social responsibility,vi thus demoting the marriage contract to a back-seat role in the 
content of intra-British unions. In this way the state has shown an increasing disinterest in the social 
characteristics of partners for ͞in-group͟ members or how they live their married lives. 
Nationals of European Economic Area countries derive their right to enter the UK and bring 
with them their EEA or non-EEA spouses thƌough theiƌ ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship of the European Union. 
Their free movement and that of their spouses is controlled and regulated by supranational 
institutions and legal systems (Treaty of Rome, 1958; Directive 2004/38/EC). The EU regulatory system 
does not direct or even allude to the content of the marriage: there are no financial requirements and 
no dependency requirements. Its ideological purpose (to ensure the free movement of workers) 
shares the same facilitating approach of UK marriage law. However, the British state has shown 
reluctance to comply with the spirit of the EU system when one spouse is a non-EEA citizen.vii  
To conclude, common sense and legal definitions of marriage in the UK consider it primarily 
as a contract between two individuals (Herring 2011). As such, these individuals are relatively free to 
determine the content of the marriage themselves, thus allowing for a wide-range of motivations for 
marriage (religious, legal, ceremonial, tradition, or even solely for the purpose of social display, 
ƌefleĐtiŶg GiddeŶs͛ (1999) claim that marriage has become a ͚shell institution͛). Whilst laws relating to 
͞faŵilǇ͟ haǀe ĐoŶtiŶued to eŶfoƌĐe the ŶotioŶ of a heteƌoseǆual ŶuĐleaƌ ŵodel, these laǁs opeƌate 
on the basis of biological ties rather than through the marriage contract (Chambers 2012). Laws 
relating directly to marriage in the UK have not been used recently by policy-makers to define or limit 
citizens to an ideal-type marriage, rather such limitations have been demonstrably eroded as seen in 
the Divorce Reform Act 1969 and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act of 2013, both of which were 
at least in part state-led consolidation of changing social attitudes.  
Extra-UK/EU Marriages – Marriage as Legal Status 
Shachar (2001) argues that the regulation of marriage between group members and non-
group members always gives rise to questions pertaining to group identity. As explained above, 




nationals of EEA countries are nominally – under the law, although frequently not in practice – treated 
as group members. The legal position of marriage between a UK resident and a non-European, 
however, has been the site of considerable group-defining activity by policy-makers such that it is now 
less of a contract between two individuals, and more of a legal status from which certain rights and 
benefits may flow or be restricted. For such marriages the state places limitations on not just who can 
marry and when marriages can be terminated, but also the (significant) consequences that flow from 
being married and from ending marriage. This divergence in legislating regulation is steeped in an 
ethŶiĐized iŵagiŶiŶg of ͞Britishness͟ ǁheƌeďǇ the ŵoƌe ŶotiĐeaďlǇ ͞other͟ migrants (by skin colour 
or religion) are perceived as the threat to the national character. viii  The regulation of marriage-
migration has become the loĐus of the ŵaŶifestatioŶ of this feaƌ ďeĐause the iŶĐoŵiŶg ͚depeŶdeŶt͛ 
spouses ͚are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended 
populatioŶ͛ ;Poǁell 1968); it is this tǇpe of ŵigƌatioŶ that ǁill ͚sǁaŵp͛ the ŶatioŶ/͛British character͛, 
undermining democracy and the rule of law (Thatcher 1978) because these migrants remain 
͚unabsorbed͛ (Collier 2013).  
The conceptualisation of women as legally ͚disabled͛ ĐitizeŶs (1870 Naturalisation Act; 
Blackstone 1769) for whom a state must act as responsible patriarch, is a fundamental part of this 
ethnicized imagining of the nation within the nation-building legislation. For white British women – 
the biological reproducers of the natioŶ͛s ethŶiĐity (see Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989) – this entailed 
a legal status which recognised them as a primary site of risk to national borders. Their ability to act 
as conduits of national identity depended on their marital status. British nationality law prohibited 
women from transmitting their nationality up until 1983 and also deprived them of their nationality if 
they, in the words of the then Secretary of State for the Colonies 1910-15, ͚deliberately married an 
alien͛ (Lewis Hardcourt, quoted in Klug 1989:22) until 1949. For non-white British women, and 
particularly women of Asian descent, their orientalised social and structural construction as the Other-
within, led to restrictions on their ability to marry outside the UK. As the following section explains, 
from 1960 to 1997 the regulation of marriage-related migration overtly targeted, in a gendered 
manner, cross-border marriages in relation to the nationality or citizenship of the applicant and the 
ethnicity of the UK sponsor. The aim was to restrict spousal migƌatioŶ ǁithiŶ ͞transnational 
communities͟ or those ͞ethnic minority groups͟ which had a sizeable presence in the UK and were 
not of European descent (particularly those from South Asia and the Caribbean). The law discriminated 
against cross-border marriages on the basis of ethnicity, and the application of this discrimination was 
gendered. Since 1997, there has been a shift in target, not least in part in response to the accusation 
of racism in the law, so that now the law restricts spousal migration on the basis of cultural and 
economic capital. A normative and nationalist conceptualisation of a masculine state protecting its 




female nation (Young 2003; Anderson 2013) remains in place and this approach still speaks to a 
definition of the majority ethnie oƌ ͞Britishness͟. Moreover, the application of this discrimination 
remains ethnicized and gendered, which is to say the law is applied to people differently on the basis 
of their ethnicity and gender. The result, as Wray succinctly puts it, is a ͚hierarchy of acceptable 
marriages͛ where ͚[t]he location of a marriage in the hierarchy depends upon the weight attached at 
a particular moment to factors such as gender, race and compliance with legal and social norms͛ (Wray 
2011:38). While the importance given to ethnic oƌigiŶ, tǇpe of ŵaƌƌiage ;e.g. ͞love͟, arranged, 
polygamous) or legal status have shifted, most noticeably in 1997, the ideology of protecting the 
nation from cultural others has remained constant. Group membership is not an unqualified right for 
anyone and marrying the ͞wrong͟ person can result in the loss of state protection and membership 
in the most extreme cases, and more frequently in the loss of benefits and rights that go with 
membership. The state interferes not just with partner choice, but with the practice of married life, 
so that the state͛s ƌeƋuiƌed soĐial ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs of the ŵaƌƌied Đouple ;a high leǀel of eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
aĐtiǀitǇ, shoǁiŶg the ŵaƌƌiage to ďe ͚suďsistiŶg͛, aŶd, theƌefoƌe, long-lasting, for example) are 
examined on three occasions spanning over five years (HC395). This section traces the ideological 
continuity within the multiple changes to nationality and immigration legislation whilst noting the 
fluctuation of intersecting – and intersectional – factors used to limit entry of particular ethnic groups. 
Pre 1948 – Protecting the bloodline 
Until the Naturalisation Act of 1844, marriage to a non-British subject, or ͚alien͛ was not 
directly regulated and the principles of comŵoŶ laǁ held that ŵaƌƌiage had Ŷo effeĐt oŶ the paƌties͛ 
nationality. The 1844 Act provided for automatic acquisition of nationality for alien women marrying 
male British subjects and allowed female British subjects to retain their British subject status on 
marriage to an alien. But this provision was repealed by the 1870 Naturalisation Act and marriage to 
an alien thence entailed automatic deprivation of British subject status for women (Fransman 1998).ix 
Such changes can be seen as state-attempted enforcement of patriarchal control over the conduits of 
national identity. The 1870 Act limited access to naturalisation, renouncement and transmission of 
ŶatioŶalitǇ to those ǁho ǁeƌe Ŷot legallǇ ͚disaďled͛. “eĐtioŶ ϭϳ states that ͚͛DisaďilitǇ͛ shall ŵeaŶ the 
status of being an infant, lunatic, idiot or married woman͛ (cited in Fransman 1998:160). A married 
woman could not, therefore, renounce her British nationality or pass on her nationality to her children. 
An unmarried women was not considered a parent, so transmission was reserved for British subject 
fathers of legitimate children and widows. This situation remained law (it was reaffirmed in the 1914 
British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act) until 1949 (Fransman 1998). 




Thus the first regulations of marriage between a British subject and an alien were enacted 
through legislation pertaining to nationality, and directly imposed an effect of legal status, speaking 
to the content of the marriage. Furthermore, it was explicitly gendered: British men, through their 
legitimate children, were the conduits of national blood. Although the British State subscribed 
formerly to jus soli until 1983 (when the 1981 British Nationality Act came into force), these legislative 
provisions have overtones of nationality acquisition being substantively more than birthplace – 
overtones which, as seen below, crept into the arena of immigration regulation as well. If, as Bevan 
argues, ͚the framing of nationality legislation is an opportunity for a State to define itself, as it please͛ 
(1986:105), then the nineteenth- and twentieth-century British state saw itself as a protective 
patriarch, a guardian of the national character through lineage. 
1948 to 1997 
The British Nationality Act of 1948 was intended to provide clarity and restructuring of the 
piecemeal nationality law that had arisen by way of the differing acquisition of colonies, dominions, 
territories and areas of protection (Fransman 1998). However, its tortuous construction left a category 
of people as ͚Bƌitish suďjeĐts ǁithout ĐitizeŶship͛ aŶd also alloǁed foƌ the uŶƌestƌiĐted eŶtƌǇ of 
Commonwealth citizens; it became in effect ͚an unplanned open-door policy͛ (Bevan, 1986:22). The 
response to this unforeseen migration came in the form of the two Commonwealth Immigration Acts 
of the 1960s, which had a significant impact on marriage-migration. Political discussions focused on 
͚ƌaĐe ƌelatioŶs͛ aŶd the iŶtegƌatioŶ of ͚Đolouƌed͛ people (Clayton 2011:11-12). Immigrants arriving in 
large numbers were presented as a threat to the existing population in terms of services and 
opportunities (housing, schools, employment) – problems which cross all migration categories – but 
also to the ͚ŶatioŶal ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛ which was raised in relation to marriage-migration (for example Powell 
1968). Legislators continued to provide separate provisions for male and female marriage migrants, 
so that for women marriage represented ͚a public declaration of allegiance as well as a private 
commitment͛ (Wray 2011:10).  
Male British citizens continued to be allowed to bring in wives and fiancées under the existing 
legislation. Nonetheless, such couples frequently experienced racially-driven procedural hurdles such 
as excessive delay and an unrealistically high bar to proving the ƌelatioŶship ͚geŶuiŶe͛. AŶ eǆtƌeŵe 
example of the latteƌ saǁ eŶfoƌĐed ͞virginity testing͟ of fiancées arriving from South Asia in the 1970s 
(Wray 2011). The physical manifestation of this racial discrimination in the law was both gender-
specific (it was, and could only, be done to women) and gender-related: women from South Asia were 
the target of this persecutory policy because of cultural assumptions on the part of UK officials about 
͞genuine͟ arranged marriages being limited to virgin females.  




For female British residents discrimination was more overt. Commonwealth husbands and 
fiaŶĐés ŵight ďe adŵitted ͚as a ĐoŶĐessioŶ͛ ďut this pƌoǀisioŶ ǁas ǁithdrawn in 1969 (Bevan 1986). 
Women who wished to bring in a non-Commonwealth husband or fiancé had the uphill struggle of 
having to prove that joining theiƌ paƌtŶeƌ aďƌoad ǁould iŶǀolǀe aŶ uŶaĐĐeptaďle degƌee of ͚haƌdship͛ 
(Bevan 1986:245). British-born ethnic minority women struggled in the courts due to prejudice against 
arranged marriages combined with racist assumptions about their better suitability than white women 
to live in poverty (Wray 2011). Both through direct legislation and through legislative interpretations 
in the courts, the state premised an idealized British-Đultuƌal Ŷoƌŵ of a geŶdeƌed ͞loǀe-ŵatĐh͟ 
defined in opposition to the culturally-other arranged marriage.  
In 1974 the Labour Government amended the rules so that the position was the same for 
incoming husbands. Just three years later, husbands (and British-resident women) were singled out 
again as purveyors of marriages of convenience (Pannick et al 1993:5). Bevan notes both the 
heightened tension provided by the press during this time (with headlines such as ͚ďƌides foƌ 
puƌĐhase͛Ϳ aŶd the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s iŶaďilitǇ aŶd uŶǁilliŶgŶess to pƌoǀide eǀideŶĐe to suppoƌt its Đlaiŵ 
that the system was being abused (1986:247). The 1977 measures – the Primary Purpose Rule – 
required the applicant to show that the primary purpose of the marriage was not for the husband to 
obtain settlement in the UK, and introduced an initial leave of twelve months (the probationary 
period) (Pannick et al 1993:5).  
In 1980 the new Conservative government strengthened these measures so that only British 
citizens – women – who had been born in the UK or had a parent who was born in the UK could 
sponsor a husband or fiancé (Pannick et al 1993). This measure had such a significant impact that the 
previous restrictions went largely unnoticed. All, however, were challenged and three women took 
their cases before the European Court of Human Rights (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK), 
arguing that the rules were discriminatory on the basis of sex, race, and in the case of Mrs. Balkandali 
who was a British citizen born outside the UK, birth. The ECtHR found iŶ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s faǀouƌ only on 
the basis of sex (para 83). In relation to birth discrimination, the Court stated that ͚there are in general 
persuasive social reasons for giving special treatment to those whose link with a country stems from 
birth within it͛ (para ϴϴͿ. It is Ŷot Đleaƌ ǁhetheƌ oŶe of those ͚geŶeƌal soĐial ƌeasoŶs͛ ǁas the UK 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ŵisogǇŶistiĐ aƌguŵeŶt to the Couƌt that the state ŵeƌelǇ aiŵed to pƌoteĐt Bƌitish 
women from – in an apparent echo of the wording of the concession mentioned above – the ͚ haƌdship͛ 
they would encounter if they had to move abroad in order to remain with their husbands (para 87). 
Both male and female marriage migrants, and their female and male British resident 
counterparts, suffered from racially-driven discrimination through this period, and this discrimination 




manifested in largely gender-specific and gender-related discriminatory, and at times persecutory, 
practices. The discourse at the point of iŶteƌseĐtioŶ ƌeǀolǀed aƌouŶd the ͚puƌpose͛ of the ŵaƌƌiage. 
The result of the historic ruling in Abdulaziz ended overt sexual discrimination within the legislation. 
The manner in which the UK government chose to legislate, however, was to restrict and reduce 
provisions for male sponsors to that of female sponsors (Pannick et al 1993). The Primary Purpose 
Rule in its gender-neutral form ran from 1985 until 1997: the state had largely accepted Poǁell͛s 
(1968) claim that permitting UK residents to enact arranged marriages with non-EU nationals was 
͚iŶsaŶe͛.  
1997 – 2014 
From 1997 to 2010, the Labour governments embraced a liberalising policy with regard to 
economic migration whilst simultaneously passing increasingly restrictive measures on family 
migration. The goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s foĐus oŶ ͚MaŶaged MigƌatioŶ͛ aloŶg ǁith its eǆpliĐit liŶkage of ŵigƌatioŶ 
and harmonious community relations within the UK, was reflective of a wish to control migration type 
over and above mere numbers (Flynn 2005). The articulated aim was for the UK to reap the economic 
benefits (although sometimes cultural and social benefits were acknowledged) of primary migrants, 
and thus measures of encouragement aimed at skilled workers were adopted into the immigration 
rules. At the same time, the unspoken context of the measures seeking to limit family migration was 
the economic disadvantage (and cultural and social) of the spouses of these migrants. The 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition of 2010-2015 curbed numbers and rescinded many of 
Laďouƌ͛s ŵoƌe opeŶ-door policies towards primary migration, whilst continuing to restrict family 
migration. Despite the apparent gender-neutrality of the legislation post-1997 as compared with the 
earlier period, assumptions of men as breadwinners (highly-skilled or otherwise) and women as 
dependents (on husbands or the state) remained the implicit backdrop of policy-making (Charsley 
2012; and see Home Office 2011). Furthermore, the political rhetoric explicitly and repeatedly 
uŶdeƌliŶed the state͛s Ŷeed to ͚pƌoteĐt͛ the ŶatioŶ, ďoth iŶ ƌelatioŶ to Đultuƌal pƌaĐtiĐe aŶd eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
welfare, reflecting a deeply ingrained conceptualisation of state and government as patriarch of a 
feminized nation.  
The restrictions on marriage-migration of the twenty-first century cannot be understood 
outside of their immediate historical context. The 1990s gave rise to a political discourse centred on 
tǁo tǇpes of ŵigƌaŶt Đheats: the ͚ďogus͛ asǇluŵ-seekeƌ aŶd the ďeŶefit ͚sĐƌouŶgeƌ͛ ;ClaǇtoŶ Ϯ011:14). 
As Clayton notes these reflect insecurity about how entry is being gained, and the type of person who 
is entering. The consequences of this debate, which took place mostly in reference to asylum rather 
than immigration law, resonate across all immigration legislation that followed.  





Since 2000 there have been a series of measures aimed directly at preventing unwanted, 
͚uŶŵaŶaged͛ ŵigƌaŶts fƌoŵ settliŶg iŶ the UK thƌough ŵaƌƌiage. Many of these measures purport 
solely to protect individual British citizens from unscrupulous outsiders, but analysis of political 
rhetoric, Home Office publications, and trends in decision-making based on ethnicity and gender, 
reveal a primary concern of protecting the economy and culture of the nation. The most prominent 
area of legal activity, government-fuŶdiŶg aŶd politiĐal ƌhetoƌiĐ has ďeeŶ aƌouŶd ͚shaŵ͛ ŵaƌƌiages. 
Wray (2011) and Charsley and Benson (2012) have observed how marriage-migration subverts 
the “tate͛s (patriarchal) presumption that it holds the prerogative over entry, since the aspiring 
immigrant is chosen by the individual sponsor rather than selected through criteria laid down by the 
state. Seeking to regain control over who is eligible for group membership – and thereby imposing 
limitations on partner-choice for citizens – successive governments introduced measures which 
expanded state surveillance of extra-UK/EU marriages. In 2001 registrars were co-opted into the realm 
of immigration enforcement by requiring them to report ͚suspiĐious͛ uŶioŶs (s.24 1999 Act). In 2005, 
the Secretary of State introduced an application procedure for non-EU nationals wishing to marry in 
the UK: the Certificate of Approval. Marriages undertaken in the Church of England were exempt. 
Successfully challenged on grounds of religious discrimination, and as being in violation of ECHR Article 
12, the right to marry, the Certificate of Approval was abolished in 2011. In response to this legal block 
the 2014 Act required registrars to notify the Secretary of State of all pending marriages involving a 
non-EEA citizen (s.56), gave the Secretary of State investigative powers to examine the content of 
these proposed marriages (s.48-54), and amended the 1949 Marriage Act so that extra-UK/EU 
marriages conducted by the Church of England also have to comply with civil preliminaries (s.57), thus 
redistributing the balance of power between citizen, church and state set by the 1753 Marriage Act.  
Otheƌ ŵeasuƌes used to iŶĐƌease the state͛s suƌǀeillaŶĐe of suĐh ŵarriages included the 2003 
͚Ŷo sǁitĐhiŶg͛ ƌule prohibiting those on visas of less than six months (such as tourists) from applying 
to remain in the UK on the basis of marriage, and the increase of the probationary period, which was 
raised in 2003 to twenty-four months, and again in 2012 to five years. There are now three stages of 
application for marriage migrants, all of which carry a fee. These measures allow the state multiple 
points – over time as well as through place – of border control, however they also shape marital 
content by requiring that such unions last for a minimum period of five years and show consistency 
across the period. 
It is pertinent to remember the gendered introduction of the probationary period which in 
1977 applied to incoming husbands only, purportedly to protect female British citizens from 




uŶsĐƌupulous ͚ǀisa-diggeƌs͛: the legal lack of capacity of women mandated by the 1870 Act remained 
explicit in 1977, and is still implicit. Discussions in 2007 similarly identified one type of sham marriage 
as being where the ͚ Bƌitish ĐitizeŶ ǁas ͚duped͛ aŶd Đlaiŵed theƌe ǁas a Ŷeed foƌ ͚increased protection 
against coercion and potentially violent or abusive situations͛ (quoted in Charsley and Benson, 
2012:12). There was and has been no data-gathering exercise in relation to this supposed protection 
need. This was not the case surrounding the need to protect British citizens from forced marriages. 
Having raised the minimum age for British sponsors of non-EEA spouses from sixteen years with 
parental approval (in line with the national age of consent) to eighteen years, the Home Office 
commissioned research on the impact of this age bar on forced marriages, and what impact raising 
the bar to twenty-one might have. The research found that raising the age had had no impact and that 
the age threshold should not be lifted higher, suggesting that this might indeed increase danger to 
British citizens involved in forced marriages since they might then be held outside of the UK (Hester 
et al 2007). The Home Office did not publish this research (the authors did so at a later date), but went 
ahead with increasing the age limit purportedly on protection grounds (Quila).  
In July 2012, the government introduced guidelines for its caseworkers (Annex FM 2.0, 
Immigration Directorate Instructions) laying out precise, and yet inherently ambiguous, criteria of 
determining genuine/sham unions. Despite an exhaustive list of factors, any such assessment must 
necessarily remain a personal (and frequently culturally-prejudiced) judgement by the designated 
offiĐial due to the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ͚simplistic binary between genuine and sham marriages͛ (Charsley 
and Benson, 2012:11). The 2014 Act (Part 4(2):55) solders this binary into statute by amending the 
ĐuƌƌeŶt defiŶitioŶ of ͚shaŵ ŵaƌƌiage͛ fouŶd iŶ the ϭϵϵϵ AĐt to add to the defiŶiŶg Đƌiteƌia that ͚there 
is no genuine relationship ďetǁeeŶ the paƌties to the ŵaƌƌiage͛. The defiŶitioŶ also iŶĐƌeases the 
sĐope of the ͚puƌpose͛ of the ŵaƌƌiage/Điǀil paƌtŶeƌship fƌoŵ the eǆistiŶg pƌoǀision (marriages which 
have been entered into to avoid the effect of UK immigration rules) to include those which are 
undertaken to enable rights under UK immigration rules, thus targeting the undesired migrants 
already on UK soil. Analysis of refusals by nationality show significant preference for applicants from 
predominantly white countries with Christian heritages (Charsley and Benson 2012), in an historical 
echo of the effects of the cultural-religious presumptions which underlay the Primary Purpose Rule. 
Just as successive judges despaiƌed oǀeƌ haǀiŶg to deteƌŵiŶe the ͚pƌiŵaƌǇ puƌpose͛ of a ŵaƌƌiage 
(Pannick et al ϭϵϵϯͿ, so it ŵaǇ pƌoǀe iŵpossiďle to asĐeƌtaiŶ ͚geŶuiŶeŶess͛, ďeĐause ͚cross-cultural 
variation in the nature of marriage is such that no universal definition may be possiďle͛ ;ChaƌsleǇ aŶd 
Benson 2012:18; Wray 2006). The ͞geŶuiŶeŶess͟ test is Ŷot oŶlǇ at poiŶt of eŶtƌǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, aŶd the 
couple must re-pƌoǀe theiƌ ͚geŶuiŶe͛ aŶd ͚suďsistiŶg͛ ŵaƌƌiage at tǁo fuƌtheƌ juŶĐtuƌes oǀeƌ the fiǀe 
year probationary period. In this way, the state regulates not just who is eligible as a marriage partner, 




but also the ongoing content of the marriage for both parties. Measurable criteria suggested by Annex 
FM 2.0 include reproduction, cohabitation and a joint mortgage.  
As well as protecting feminized citizens from non-EU nationals – particularly poor ones – the 
state͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes also pƌofess the Ŷeed to pƌoteĐt the ŶatioŶ fƌoŵ uŶpƌoduĐtiǀe ;pooƌͿ ŵigƌaŶts 
(see for example Cameron 2013). The reasoning behind this argument is found in the 2011 Home 
Office publication produced for a public consultation on family migration. Here the authors note that 
the employment rate for non-EU male partners is 68%, above that of the UK average (64%), whereas 
for females it is 44%, ͚considerably lower than the UK average for female employment (53%)͛ (HO, 
2011:s.3). The report goes on to note that employment rates for certain nationalities (Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani) are ͚especially low͛. The implication is that female family migrants (who make up 68% of 
spouse applications) are a drain on the economy, an implication which runs contrary to research on 
female labour migrants (Kofman and Raghuram 2004). Indeed, Kofman (2004) has argued that this 
extends to prejudice against family migration as a whole which is seen in policy terms as subsidiary to, 
and a problematic result of, migration driven by labour markets. This attitude is also reflected in 
refusal rates in which husbands fare disproportionately poorly because of underlying assumptions 
about male economic motivation (Charsley and Benson 2012). Loss of control over the selection of 
those it perceives as primary migrants has continued to be a concern to successive governments, and 
gendered readings of family migration continue to be prominent.  
In 2012, the changes to the spouse route of entry included a financial requirement that the 
UK sponsor show minimum income of £18,600 per annum or cash savings of £64,000 (HC395:App.FM 
E-ECP.3). This is significantly above the minimum wage (138% according to Wray et al 2015) and 
therefore precludes a section of the population from living in the UK with non-EU partners on the basis 
of socio-economic grounds. This criterion must be demonstrated over a minimum five-and-a-half-year 
period thus also regulating the content of the marriage. Forty-seven percent of the UK working 
population in 2012 would fail to meet the income requirements to sponsor a non-EU spouse (APPG 
on Migration 2013). While this measure is on the surface gender-neutral, the gender pay-gap (9.5% 
for full-time work in 2012; the part-time workforce is predominantly female, ONS 2013), means that 
female sponsors are disproportionately affected. In addition research into ethnicity pay-gaps indicates 
that men and women from ethnic minorities are more likely to be adversely affected than white British 
men (Wray et al 2015:63).  
Whilst feminists have long-since noted the existence in welfare provision of a gendered binary 
of active-citizen/dependent (Fineman 2004; Jamieson and Cunningham-Burley 2003), these rules go 
oǀeƌ aŶd aďoǀe liŵitiŶg the ageŶĐǇ, aŶd/oƌ ĐitizeŶship ƌights of ͞depeŶdeŶt͟ ĐitizeŶs. The ƌules 




puƌpoƌt to disĐƌiŵiŶate ͞puƌelǇ͟ oŶ the ďasis of eĐoŶoŵiĐ Đapital, ďut the iŶĐoŵe leǀel is set 
significantly higher than the minimum wage – this is not in any way about cost to the Treasury (see 
Wray et al 2015). These rules limit the rights of particular citizens, so that where in 1870 the legally 
͚disaďled͛ ǁeƌe iŶfaŶts, luŶatiĐs, idiots aŶd ŵaƌƌied ǁoŵeŶ ;s.17, Naturalisation Act), today the legally 
͚disaďled͛ aƌe ŵost feŵale ĐitizeŶs aŶd ŵaŶǇ ŵale ĐitizeŶs fƌoŵ ethŶiĐ ŵiŶoƌities.x 
Integration 
The state͛s dutǇ to pƌoteĐt iŶdiǀidual ĐitizeŶs aŶd the ǁelfaƌe state ;joďs aŶd ƌesouƌĐesͿ fƌoŵ 
unscrupulous non-group members is a standpoint which has been frequently articulated by Prime 
Ministers and Home Secretaries since 1997. Less explicit at the government-level during this period, 
has been the argument that the culture of Britain also requires protection. Instead, politicians employ 
a euphemistic disĐouƌse aƌouŶd the ŶotioŶ of ͚iŶtegƌatioŶ͛, aloŶg ǁith seleĐt use of the ͚stiĐkǇ ǁoƌds͛ 
(Ahmed 2004) associated with loss of cultural integrity borrowed from Powell and Thatcher.xi  
IŶtegƌatioŶ as a pƌoteĐtiǀe ŵeasuƌe agaiŶst soĐial dishaƌŵoŶǇ aŶd ͚hoŵe-gƌoǁŶ͛ teƌƌoƌisŵ 
was the theme of the Laďouƌ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s appƌoaĐh to immigration and asylum law. Political rhetoric 
foĐused oŶ the asǇluŵ ͚Đƌisis͛,xii the so-Đalled ͚ƌaĐe-ƌiots͛ of ϮϬϬϭ aŶd ϮϬϬϱ, aŶd the JulǇ ϮϬϬϱ attaĐks 
on the transport system in London (see Blaiƌ ϮϬϬϲ ͚The DutǇ to IŶtegƌate͛Ϳ. Measures introduced in 
the name of integration, however, sought to further limit – by cultural capital – incoming spouses 
rather than improve the social and economic living conditions for British citizen ethnic minorities. In 
ϮϬϬϳ, the ͚ Life iŶ the UK͛ test ǁas iŶtƌoduĐed foƌ those applǇiŶg foƌ settleŵeŶt oŶ the ďasis of ŵaƌƌiage 
to a British citizen or a person lawfully settled in the UK. In 2013, the government altered this test 
reducing the practical knowledge element and increasing the historical (nationalist) element of UK 
culture and society (BBC 2013a).xiii In 2010, the government introduced a requirement that the spousal 
applicant show proficiency in the English language (HC395:281). 
Kofman posits that the family, and therefore family migration, ͚represents the social 
dimension [of migration], often associated with tradition͛ and is seen as a ͚socialising agent͛ 
(2004:248). Thus underlying the discourse of integration and the measures taken in its name, is 
actuallǇ a feaƌ of loss of Đultuƌal iŶtegƌitǇ oƌ aŶ ͚eǆĐess of alteƌitǇ͛ as Gƌillo Đalled it ;ϮϬϬϳͿ. “pousal 
migration is at the forefront of this fear due to the perceived loss of control by the state over the type 
of immigrant entering (Shah 2010). The PrimarǇ Puƌpose ‘ule ǁas puƌpoƌtedlǇ aiŵed at the ͚ďogus͛ 
marriage applicant (at point of entry), but the practical result was to discriminate against and limit 
entry of South Asians. In the same vein, the introduction of an English language requirement and the 
financial aspect to the 2012 rules, puƌpoƌts to taƌget the ͚scrounger͛ iŵŵigƌaŶt ǁho ǁill ƌefuse to 
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converse in English and live off benefits in a minority ghettoxiv – indeed Cameron (2013) argues that 
welfare reform and immigration policy are ͚two sides of the same coin͛, the ͚ĐoiŶ͛ iŶ this Đase being 
the ͚͞something for nothing͟ culture͛.  
ChaƌsleǇ͛s (2012) aŶalǇsis of ƌefusal ƌates ďǇ ŶatioŶalitǇ suppoƌts WƌaǇ͛s (2011) findings of a hierarchy 
of acceptable marriages based on her qualitative study of decision-makers. The highest levels of 
refusals of spouse visas are for nationality groups where ͚marriage-related migration is perceived as 
predominantly intra-ethŶiĐ͛ (e.g. British Pakistanis marrying Pakistani nationals) (Charsley 2012:200). 
Collieƌ͛s pƌo-assiŵilatioŶist staŶĐe oŶ ǁelĐoŵiŶg the ͚ĐultuƌallǇ pƌoǆiŵate͛ ŵigƌaŶts fƌoŵ 
͚AlŵostUsLaŶd͛ ;oƌ PolaŶdͿ aŶd liŵitiŶg those fƌoŵ the ͚ĐultuƌallǇ distaŶt […] Maƌs͛ ;BaŶgladesh) 
(2013:89-91) is already in practice across Europe, both within the national legislative systems as 
offiĐials aĐt as ͚ŵoƌal gatekeepeƌs͛ to the ŶatioŶ ;Bonjour and Block, forthcoming; Wray 2006; Carver 
2013) and at the supranational EU level (de Hart 2007). 
Conclusion 
Bevan noted the ͚sharp contrast [emerging] between family and immigration laws [...] since the 
former generally regards the ceremony and certificate of marriage as conclusive regardless of ulterior 
motives [...], whereas the latter looks to the reality rather than form of the marriage so as to discover 
if the marriage is genuine͛ (1986:247). This contrast has been sharpened to a knife-edge up to the 
pƌeseŶt daǇ. Loƌd Millet͛s ϮϬϬϰ ĐoŵŵeŶt that legallǇ ŵaƌƌiage ͚need not be loving, sexual, stable, 
faithful, long-lasting, or contented͛ (quoted in Herring 2011:43), is not an opinion held by immigration 
courts: 
Notions of marriage naturally vary between cultures, but we do not think that it would 
be wrong to regard permanence and exclusivity as essential features of the institution. 
Deputy President of Immigration Tribunal Ockelton (2007) quoted in Shah (2010:31). 
The British state has little to say about the content of intra-UK unions. The law on marital status has 
broadened to reflect the radical changes in social attitudes to the institution of marriage. Marriages 
involving a non-EU partner, however, are expected to conform, and required to display conformity 
(Carver 2013), to an ideal-type of ͚love͛ partnership, where having a joint mortgage is weightier 
evidence of commitment than a marriage certificate, or in the alternative a reified notion of the 
͚aƌƌaŶged ŵaƌƌiage͛ ;Carver 2013; Kofman 2004; Wray 2006). In tandem with the frequently 
xenophobic intent of immigration laws and practice, runs a latent cultural mysogynist image of the 
family which holds men to be primary migrants or workers and women to be secondary migrants and 
non-workers. Despite academic work drawing out the nuances and intersections between economic 




and marital motivations for migration (Piper and Roces 2003) and despite strong data evidencing 
significant social change in this area (i.e. women as primary migrants) (Charsley et al, 2012) the UK 
government continues to operate with a reductive and simplistic ethnicized and gendered approach 
to marriage migration. Furthermore, a reflection on the historical approach to marriage between 
British people and aliens shows that although the discourse changes, the substance of the arguments, 
which is to say the ideology of protecting the ŶatioŶ͛s ǀalues fƌoŵ ďeiŶg oǀeƌ-run by cultural others, 
remains the same. The state has radically adapted legal provisions to reflect the dramatic changes in 
social attitudes towards marriage with regard to its intra-UK marriage. However, in concert with these 
liberalising alterations, the same state has shown a constant patriarchal and conservative approach to 
marriage between British residents and non-patrials. In this sense, membership of a minority ethnic 
group and/or femaleness arguably has alreadǇ ďeĐoŵe a ͚disaďilitǇ͛ uŶdeƌ the laǁ.  
i ͚[...] there was a committee which looked at it and said that if we went on as we are then by the end of the 
century there would be four million people of the new Commonwealth or Pakistan here. Now, that is an awful 
lot and I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by 
people with a different culture and, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law 
and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to 
react and be rather hostile to those ĐoŵiŶg iŶ.͛ ;ThatĐheƌ 1978) 
ii ͚We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, 
who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like 
watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre. So insane are we that we actually permit 
unmarried persons to immigrate for the purpose of founding a family with spouses and fiancées whom they 
have never seen͛. (Powell 1968) 
iii The 1708 Act was a vehicle to allow Calvanist Huguenots fleeing a surge of religious intolerance in Catholic 
France to naturalize in the UK. 
iv Non-group members (then Jews and Quakers) were exempt from the law. 
v As was seen in a 2003 case where the Couƌt of Appeal ƌefused to ͚examine the reason why the couple wanted 
to marry and ĐoŶsideƌ if it ǁas a ǀalid oŶe.͛ (Herring 2011:43). 
vi This move is reflected in the Children Act 1989, the Child Support Act 1990, the Human Fertilization and 
Embryology Act 1990 and the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (see Chambers 2012). 
vii The key cases in this arena are: Surinder Singh (1992) where the ECJ forced the UK government to accept 
that Bƌitish ŶatioŶals ǁho had ǁoƌked iŶ aŶotheƌ EU ĐouŶtƌǇ ǁeƌe ͚Ƌualified peƌsoŶs͛ aŶd theƌefoƌe Đould 
bring in a non-EU spouse without reference to national immigration legislation; Akrich (2003); and Metock and 
Ors (2008) where Ireland, supported by the UK, which had legislated against this in the form of Regulation 12 
of the 2006 EEA Regulations, argued that unlawful residents should not get provisions of EU law even when 
married to a qualifying citizen. The ECJ disagreed but it took the UK government three years to amend the 
Regulations (Clayton, 2011). The regulations have ďeeŶ aŵeŶded agaiŶ ;iŶ faǀouƌ of the UK goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
interpretation) since the case of O and B v Netherlands. The EU Commission has stated the current regulations 
do not comply with the Directive. 
viii See Modood (2014) on how a Muslim / non-Muslim binary has become the dominant frame of identity 
discussions in the UK. 
ix Such women could apply to re-naturalize in the event of widowhood. 
x A potential source of mitigation against restrictive immigration legislation can be found in the right to respect 
for private and family life laid down by Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and brought into 
national legislation in the form of the Human Rights Act 1998. This is a qualified right, however, and the ECtHR 
has repeatedly reiterated the nature of its qualification, in particular noting that individual state members 
retain the authority to regulate the entry of non-EU migrants.  
xi Most ƌeĐeŶtlǇ the DefeŶĐe “eĐƌetaƌǇ iŶ ϮϬϭϰ said that Bƌitish toǁŶs ǁeƌe ďeiŶg ͚sǁaŵped͛ ďy immigrants 
aŶd ĐitizeŶs ǁeƌe ͚uŶdeƌ siege͛; Hoŵe “eĐƌetaƌǇ Daǀid BluŶkett iŶ ϮϬϬϯ said asǇluŵ seekeƌs ǁeƌe ͚sǁaŵpiŶg͛ 
                                                          




                                                                                                                                                                                    
loĐal sĐhools; CoŶseƌǀatiǀe Leadeƌ Williaŵ Hague iŶ ϮϬϬϬ used the ǁoƌds ͚sǁaŵped͛ aŶd ͚flooded͛ iŶ a deďate 
about immigration (Ahmed 2004). 
xii In 2003, Blair promised to cut the numbers of asylum seekers by 50% within a few months (BBC, 2003). 
xiii The sample test includes questions on empire, religion, and the Queen. 
xiv Even before these changes took place there was evidence of a disproportionate application of the law by 
nationality in terms of refusals of spouse visas (Charsley 2012). 
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